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that the plaintiff had requested a transfer to another department and was
laid off when it was found that no vacancy existed. Subsequently, the
determination was amended and it was ruled that the plaintiff had quit
without "just cause," a disqualifying event. On appeal, the Board of Re-
view determined that she had been discharged for "just cause," which also
resulted in disqualification. The common pleas court, upon reviewing
the record, held that the administrative findings were unreasonable, arbi-
trary and against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the court of
appeals determined that there was abundant evidence in the record to sup-
port the finding that the claimant had been discharged for "just cause."
EDWIN R. TEPLE
TAXATION
REAL PROPERTY TAx
On December 4, 1959, the Board of Tax Appeals adopted revised
uniform rules for the valuation of real property effective for the tax
year 1959, and thereafter.' According to the new rules, realty is to be
valuated at its "true value in money" rather that at "taxable value" or
"assessed value." Because of some confusion that exists regarding the
relationship between the fair market value of realty and its assessed value
for purposes of real property taxation, it appears appropriate to cite in
its entirety Rule 100 of the Revised Board of Tax Appeals Rules which
defines "true value in money" as follows:
RULE 100. DEFINITION. - The true value in money of real prop-
erty as here used means the value to be determined, in the first instance,
by the County Auditor as the assessor of real property in his county on
consideration of all the facts relating to the physical nature and con-
struction of the property, its availability for the purpose for which it was
acquired or constructed, or for the purpose for which it is, or may be,
used, and every other applicable factor which may tend to indicate the
value of the property such as actual cost, value as indicated by reproduc-
tion cost% physical and functional depreciation and obsolescence, if any,
market value, and the income capacity of the property, if any. The
assessor shall likewise take into consideration the location of the prop-
erty and the valuations of similar properties in the same locality. (Em-
phasis added.)
Except for the period from September 9, 1957, to November 4, 1959,
when the law required realty to be assessed at "taxable value," realty is
required by law to be assessed at its "true value in money."2
1. 1 CCH OsIo TAx REP. 5 23-850-59 (1960).
2. 127 Ohio Laws 67 (1957), amending OHIo REV. CODE § 5713.01, amended subse-
quently by 128 Ohio Laws 412 (1959).
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The revised rules also require valuation and appraisal of buildings,
structures and improvements to land on the basis of reproduction costs
at prices prevailing during the month of January, 1956, in the county
where the land is situated, less depreciation, obsolescence, and other
allowances. The previous rules required such valuation and appraisal on
the basis of January, 1950, costs, less the proper allowances.
There were several interesting cases decided by the Supreme Court
of Ohio during 1960 which deserve mention here. In Western In-
dustries, Incorporated v. Board of Revision,' the realty owner was appeal-
ing the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in adopting the valuation
ascribed to the property by the County Board of Revision. The tax-
payer contended that section 5717.03 of the Ohio Revised Code4 was
unconstitutional because "true value in money" has no known or ascer-
tainable meaning and that the Board of Tax Appeals erred in its hold-
ing that its duty was to determine whether the taxpayer carried its
burden in showing the Board of Revision's determination to be excessive.
The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that "true value in
money" is a constitutional term, contained in article XII section 2 of the
Ohio constitution, and that the failure of section 5717.03 "to further
define the term, does not render the statute so vague or indefinite as to
be meaningless."' The court further stated that the taxpayer has the
burden of proving his right to a reduction in valuation even though no
evidence is adduced against its claim.
In another case' where the taxpayer appealed the affirmance by the
Board of Tax Appeals of the valuation set by the Board of Revision, the
taxpayer urged that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was un-
reasonable and unlawful; it was argued that the Board's adoption of the
Board of Revision's valuation figures, without allowing the taxpayer
any opportunity to submit testimony relative to the valuations, was an
unconstitutional denial of due process of law. In reversing and re-
manding the Board of Tax Appeals' decision, the supreme court said that
since the Board had had two appraisal figures as to building value pre-
sented in evidence before it, the Board could have accepted and adopted
any valuation figure, supported by evidence which in its discretion it
considered to be true value. However, by adopting the valuation made
by the Board of Revision, it erred in not admitting examination and
cross-examination by the taxpayer relative to the determination by the
Board of Revision relied upon by it.
3. 170 Ohio St. 340, 164 N.E.2d 741 (1960).
4. Section 5717.03 provides that, "In the case of an appeal from a decision of a county board
of revision the board of tax appeals shall determine the true value in money of the property
whose valuation or assessment by the county board of revision is complained of...
5. 170 Ohio St. 340, 341, 164 N.E.2d 741, 742 (1960).
6. Shaker Square Co. v. Board of Revision, 170 Ohio St. 369, 165 N.E.2d 431 (1960).
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An unusual issue was presented in New York Central Railroa v.
Board of Revision.7 This case involved the valuation of real property
situated in the City of Cleveland along the shore of Lake Erie. The tax-
payer, appealing the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, contended that
the subject property was composed entirely of land fill which, at most,
was an improvement made'in the exercise of a littoral right and that
such littoral right and improvements made in the exercise thereof were
not separately taxable as real property. The Board of Tax Appeals
found from the record that the subject property, formerly submerged
land, was liable to real property taxation until suh property was
exempted by the Board of Tax Appeals or a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. The supreme court, affirmed the Board's decision, finding that
it was not unreasonable or unlawful.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Because of possible federal income tax benefits and other advantages,
it has become fairly common for manufacturers, instead of purchasing, to
lease machinery and equipment used in their operations. This situation
presents the question whether leased machinery and equipment which
is used by the lessee for manufacturing, but which is owned by a lessor
who is not a manufacturer, should be listed for personal property taxation
'at fifty per "cent 'or'at seventy per cent? This question was well con-
sidered and answered in a recent Board of Tax Appeals decision.8 In that
case the taxpayer contended that the use of the machinery and equipment
provides the sole test under sections 5711.16, 5711.22, and related sec-
tions of the Ohio Revised Code, and that if the property is used in manu-
facturing by a lessee, it is entitled to the fifty per cent classification
regardless of the fact that it is owned by someone other than the manu-
facturer. The Tax Commissioner argued that if such property is not
owned by the manufacturer it must be listed at seventy per cent of
book value. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the taxpayer and
determined "that the use of machinery and equipment in manufacturing
should be, and is, the only test for its listing and assessment for taxation
and that the status of the owner or of the person in whose name the
machinery is listed for taxation is immaterial." The Board stated that
though the legislature has the power to classify property for the purposes
of taxation it does not have power to classify taxpayers, and that, obvi-
ously, the Tax Commissioner has no such power. Therefore, any rule
promulgated by the Tax Commissioner which classifies taxpayers is in-
valid.
7. 171 Ohio St. 320, 170 N.E.2d 738 (1960).
8. First Nat'l Bank v. Bowers, 2 CCH OHIo TAx REP. (Pt. 2) 5 201-018 (1960).
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An unusual result is found in Southland Stores Number 3, Incorpo-
rated v. Bowers,9 where the court considered at what time a taxpayer
becomes engaged in business for purposes of personal property taxation
within the meaning of former section 5711.03 of the Ohio Revised
Code."0 The taxpayer was engaged in the business of leasing depart-
ment store equipment and had begun acquiring such equipment during
September, 1956. On April 13, 1956, taxpayer had agreed to lease
equipment to a retail department store, the fixtures to be delivered and
the rental payments to begin on February 4, 1957. On January 1, 1957,
taxpayer maintained an inventory for leasing of $246,309.01. None
of the equipment had been installed and the building in which it was
to be used was in the process of construction. Pursuant to the lease,
the taxpayer delivered possession of store equipment in the amount of
$758,947 on February 4, 1957. The Tax Commissioner, affirmed by
the Board of Tax Appeals, determined that the taxpayer had not be-
come "engaged in business" until February 4, 1957, and that all its
activity prior thereto was only preparatory to engaging in business;
accordingly, the Tax Commissioner increased the personal property tax
assessment for 1957. The taxpayer contended that it was engaged in
business as of tax listing day, January 1, 1957. The supreme court
affirmed the Board and found, using the magic words, that the decision of
the Board was "not unreasonable or unlawful."
An amendment to section 5711.22 of the Revised Code" enlarged
the provision requiring that investments that have not yielded any income
during the calendar year be listed and assessed as unproductive invest-
ments at their true monetary value on tax listing day; the provision now
includes investments that have not been outstanding for the full calendar
year immediately proceeding tax listing day. In a letter dated February
16, 1960, the Ohio Tax Commissioner ruled that this amendment re-
quired taxation of investments which had not been outstanding for the
full calendar year, regardless of the listing method employed by the tax-
payer or whether the investment produced income. Accordingly, if the
taxpayer uses the federal election method of reporting his income-
yielding investments, he must exclude amounts received on these invest-
ments and must list them separately as unproductive investments.
SALES AND USE TAX
Several notable cases were decided by the Board of Tax Appeals con-
cerning the definition of "price" for sales tax purposes. The issue in
9. 171 Ohio St. 271, 169 N.E.2d 549 (1960).
10. Former OHIo REV. CODE § 5711.03, was amended by 127 Ohio Laws 650 (1957), the
present statute.
11. 128 Ohio Laws 244 (1959).
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Guzzo v. Bowers,'2 was whether, in determining the sales price of per-
sonal property, a reduction in the consideration for such sale can be made
by agreement of the parties after the sale is consummated. The Board
found that monthly rental sales of equipment were consummated when
the invoice for the sale was issued for the amount of the sale and the sales
tax charged thereon. After the invoice was paid, the parties agreed to
reduce the sales price. The Board, in interpreting section 5739.01 of the
Revised Code which defines "price," held that, under the facts presented,
no such reduction could be made for sales tax purposes. The Board af-
firmed the Tax Commissioner's determination of a sales tax deficiency
based on the original amount of the retail rental sales. In another case"3
involving rental sales, the Board held that a lessor of business machines
could not deduct maintenance labor costs from the sales tax base incurred,
although maintenance was required by the terms of the lease, and the
maintenance labor charge was itemized separately from the rental fee on
the invoices. The Board conceded that a transaction that involves a
charge for labor only is not a "sale," but concluded that the taxpayer-
lessor's expenses, incurred in keeping its own equipment in usable condi-
tion, were its own obligation and were not deductible in computing rental
price under section 5739.01 (H) of the Revised Code.
In Travnikar v. Bowers," "'price" was defined for the discount retail
seller of appliances and furniture who computed his sales tax liability as
follows: added three per cent for sales tax to the suggested list price of
the item; subtracted the discount given to the buyer; from the remainder,
subtracted the amount of sales tax based on the list price; and multiplied
this remainder by three per cent to determine his sales tax liability. The
Tax Commissioner contended that the sales tax due was the amount com-
puted on the suggested list price. However, the Board disagreed with
both the Commissioner and the taxpayer. Finding that since the taxpayer
actually received, as consideration for the sale, the suggested list price
plus three per cent thereof minus the discount, the Board held that the
sales tax should be computed on this sum.
EXEMPTIONS
Property
A controlling test determining the tax exempt status of property
owned by a charitable institution was set forth by the Ohio Supreme
Court in National Headquarters Disabled American Veterans v. Bowers.'5
12. Ohio B.T.A. No. 42513 (Aug. 4, 1960), 3 CCH Omo TAx REP. 1 200-049 (1960).
13. International Business Machs. v. Bowers, Ohio B.T.A. No. 42580 (June 10, 1960), 3
CCH OHIo TAX REp. 5 200-010 (1960).
14. Ohio B.T.A. No. 43065 (Oct. 20, 1960), 3 CCH OHIO TAx REp. 5 200-071 (1960).
15. 171 Ohio St. 312, 170 N.E.2d 731 (1960).
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The taxpayer, a charitable institution, used certain personal and real prop-
erty in the assembling, distribution, and mailing of small plastic replicas
of motor-vehicle license plates known as "Idento-Tags." These tags, to-
gether with literature describing the purpose of the organization and re-
questing contributions from the recipients, were mailed to owners of mo-
tor vehicles all over the United States. Taxpayer contended that such
property should be exempted under section 5709.12 of the Revised Code
providing for the exemption of "real and tangible personal property be-
longing to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable purposes,"
and under section 5709.17 relating to property held by a war veterans
organization. The supreme court referred to article XII section 2 of the
Ohio constitution which provides that general laws may be passed to ex-
empt from taxation "institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes."
The court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals and held
that the property in question was not being used exclusively for charitable
purposes, even though the income from the "Idento-Tags" was ultimate-
ly used exclusively for charitable purposes; therefore, the subject property
was not tax exempt.
A similar issue, presented in two Board of Tax Appeals cases decided
in August of 1960, was apparently resolved differently in each case.
In the first case,"6 a township acquired land adjacent to its fire station
in January, 1959, for the express purpose of enlarging the station. Con-
struction of the addition did not commence until after the tax lien date
for the year 1960. The Board, citing two supreme court cases, 7 held
that where a public authority acquires and holds property for a public
use, such property is entitled to exemption, notwithstanding the fact
that the property is not so used on or prior to the tax lien date in the
year for which application for tax exemption is filed. In the second case'
decided by the Board, the facts were strikingly similar but the result as
strikingly dissimilar. Here an Ohio charitable corporation purchased
land in June, 1956, for the express purpose of constructing a church.
Construction did not begin until September of 1959, and the property
until that time had been used for no purpose whatsoever. The Board de-
nied the tax exemptions requested for the above mentioned period, find-
ing a distinction between property owned by a public authority and that
which is privately owned. The Board further held that section 5709.07
of the Revised Code only allows exemption to a religious organization
for a house used exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture
16. Board of Township Trustees of Clearcreek, Ohio B.T.A. No. 43411 (Aug. 4, 1960),
3 CCH OHIO TAX REP. 5 200-065 (1960).
17. Carney v. School Dist. Pub. Library, 169 Ohio St. 65, 157 N.E.2d 311 (1959); City of
Cleveland v. Carney, 169 Ohio St. 259, 158 N.E.2d 895 (1959).
18. Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church, Ohio B.T.A. No. 42968 (Aug. 8, 1960), 3
CCH OHIo TAx REP. 5 200-055 (1960).
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therein, ard the ground attached to the building niecessary to its use. It
then concluded that there was na "house" or building on the premises
for the tax years in question, and that no exemption could be granted.
It is noted, however, that in its opinion the Board restated "the long-rec-
ognized view" that exemption from taxation applies only to such public
property as is actually used for public purposes at the time exemption of
such property is sought.
in Joslyn Manufacturing and Supply Company v. Powers9 the su-
preme court explained the exemption from personal property tax granted
to merchandise held "for storage only" under section 5701.08 of the Re-
vised Code. The taxpayer was an Illinois corporation having a place of
business in Cincinnati, Ohio. Merchandise was shipped to the office in
Cincinnati, and some items, without being processed, manufactured, or
treated irr any way in Ohio, were shipped to points outside of Ohio upon
order by customers of the taxpayer. The court considered its previous
decisions which interpreted the phrase "for storage only" as used in sec-
tion 5701.08 and found them not controlling; in previous cases the prop-
erty sought to be exempted was held by the taxpayer for use in the pro-
duction of its ultimate product. In the instant case, the court found that
the property was never treated in any way by the taxpayer. Reversing the
Board of Tax Appeals, the court held that the personal property of the
taxpayer was held in inventory subject to resale and therefore returnable
as personal property "used in business." The court further commented
that it was taking a realistic view because words and phrases used in tax
statutes should be construed a they are traditionally understood; and the
traditional concept of the words "for storage only" does not encompass
the operatiori of the taxpayer. Goods offered for sale by a taxpayer are
not held for storage only "while they are, figuiatively speaking, on his
shelves awaiting distribution to his customers.""0
Sales Tax
The weight accorded by the Ohio, Supreme Court to a decision by the
Board of Tax Appeals, regarding claimed sales tax exemptions for tangi-
ble personal property used by a taxpayer directly in manufacturing,
processing, ete.,2 ' was demonstrated in Hercules Galionz Products, Incor-
porated a. Bowets." The court, in affirming the Board's decision in all
respects, said that it has, in a long line of cases, prescribed certain rules
for determining the issue, and some measure of finality must be accorded
to the Board's application of these rules to- various factual situations, Thi
19. 170 Ohio St. 575, 167 N.E.2d 349 (1960).
20. Id. at 579, 167 N.E.2d at 352.
21. OlIO REV. CoDE § 5739.01.
22. 171 Ohio St. 176, 168 N.E.2d 404 (1960).
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